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CHAPTER 1 
Contracts 
SURVEY Stafft 
§ 1.1. Recovery for Loss of Good Will under Breach of Implied War-
ranty.* In Massachusetts, an implied warranty of merchantability is pro-
vided for in the General Laws, chapter 106, section 2-314. 1 Under this 
section, an implied warranty runs with all goods purchased from a seller 
who is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, unless the warranty 
is otherwise properly modified or excluded. 2 In order to recover where 
the goods prove to be unmerchantable, the buyer must show that he 
notified the seller within a reasonable time after the discovery of the 
defect. 3 
Where both breach of implied warranty of merchantability and suffi-
cient notice of that breach are established, the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U .C.C. or Code) incorporated in General Laws, chapter 106, permits 
remedies to be administered liberally so as to place the aggrieved party 
in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed. 4 Thus, 
under the General Laws, chapter 106, section 2-715, a buyer may recover 
all reasonable incidental and consequential damages arising from the 
breach. 5 Moreover, where there is adequate evidence that the breach of 
warranty caused injury to a buyer's business reputation, courts have 
awarded damages for loss of good will. 6 Because of its speculative nature, 
however, loss of good will is often more difficult to prove. As a result, 
courts often have denied recovery for loss of good will on the basis of 
t Thomas J. Barton, Jeffrey C. Hadden, Elizabeth M. Leonard. 
*Thomas Barton, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 1.1. I G.L. c. 106, § 2-314. 
2 !d. While there is no one definition of merchantability, section 2-314 enumerates several 
criteria for determining whether in fact goods are merchantable. Among other requirements, 
the goods sold must pass without objection in the trade under the contract description and 
must be fit for the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used. Id. 
3 G.L. c. 106, § 2-607(a)(3). For a discussion of the type of notice required under the 
Uniform Commercial Code seeR. ANDERSON, 2 ANDERSON ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE 
§§ 2-607:25-44 (2d ed. 1971). 
4 G.L. c. 106, §§ 1-106 and 2-715. 
s G.L. c. 106, § 2-715. 
6 See, e.g., Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Adams v. J.l. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d I (1970). 
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insufficiency of evidence.7 Furthermore, the inherent difficulty in proving 
good will damages has led some jurisdictions, such as Pennsylvania, to 
disallow such damages as a matter of law. 
Under Pennsylvania law, which like Massachusetts, is modeled on the 
U.C.C., loss of good will is never recoverable. 8 Pennsylvania courts 
reason that the U .C.C. was not intended to enlarge the scope of damages 
previously recoverable under the Uniform Sales Act which made no 
provision for loss of good will.9 Pennsylvania courts also have empha-
sized that good will is by nature too speculative to afford any reasonable 
calculation. 10 
In spite of these concerns, Massachusetts and several other jurisdic-
tions will allow recovery for loss of good will due to breach of warranty 
in appropriate cases. 11 Before the enactment of the Code in chapter 106, 
Massachusetts case law recognized loss of good will as an available 
remedy for damages resulting from the use of warranted material proving 
to be unfit. 12 Since the adoption of the Code, Massachusetts has ad-
dressed the issue of good will damages for breach of warranty only once 
in Matsushita Electric Corporation of America v. Sonus Corporation. 13 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the award in Matsushita, 
the Court noted that the injury actually represented loss of prospective 
profits rather than good will. 14 During the Survey year in Delano Growers 
Cooperative Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts specifically held that recovery for loss of good will is 
an appropriate remedy under sections 2-314, and -715, where there is 
both sufficient evidence connecting the breach to an injury to business 
reputation, and an adequate basis for calculation of the resulting loss. 15 
From 1935 to November 1978, the Supreme Wine Company (Supreme) 
operated a plant which bottled finished wine. 16 In 1968, Supreme began 
7 See, e.g., Aldon Indus., Inc. v. Don Meyers & Associates, Inc., 517 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 
1975); Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Goslee Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md. App. 
452, 339 A.2d 302 (1975). 
8 See, e.g., Eastern Dental Corp. v. Isaac Masel Co., 502 F. Supp. 1354, 1365 (E.D. Pa. 
1980); Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455, 465 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Harry Rubin & Sons, 
Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 396 Pa. 506, 512-13, 153 A.2d 472, 476 (1959). 
9 E.g., Rubin & Sons, Inc., 396 Pa. at 512-13. 153 A.2d at 476. 
10 E.g., id. at 513, 396 A.2d at 476. 
11 See supra note 7; see also infra notes 49 to 53. 
12 See, e.g., Royal Paper Box Co. v. Munro & Church Co., 284 Mass. 446,452, 188 N.E. 
223, 225 (1933). 
13 362 Mass. 246, 264, 284 N.E.2d 880, 890 (1972). 
14 Matsushita, 362 Mass. at 264, 284 N.E.2d at 890. 
15 Delano Grower's Cooperative Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 393 Mass. 666, 473 
N.E.2d 1066 (1985). 
16 Id. at 669, 473 N.E.2d at 1069. 
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purchasing sweet wine from the Delano Winery (Delano) in CaliforniaY 
Around April or May of 1973, a large number of customers began re-
turning the sweet wine because it contained a cottony substance later 
analyzed as lactobacillus trichodes (Fresno mold). 18 Shortly thereafter, 
Supreme identified the defective wine as originating from the Delano 
vineyards, and notified the seller through oral reports and complaints 
about the problem. 19 
Because Supreme's patrons continued to return sweet wine identified 
as Delano's, Supreme withheld a payment of $25,823.25 due on the last 
shipment of wine, and again notified Delano of the problems with the 
spoiled wine. 20 When Delano failed to act upon its promises of assistance 
for over a year, Supreme's vice-president wrote a letter requesting assis-
tance and explaining the crisis caused by the tainted wine. 21 As a result 
of this letter, Delano sent one of its experts to Supreme's Boston plant. 22 
Delano's agent advised Supreme to pasturize, reprocess, refilter and 
rebottle the defective wine. 23 Supreme complied with this advice and 
managed to resell some of the wine but still refused to pay for the last 
shipment. 24 Subsequently, Supreme was forced to liquidate.25 
The Delano winery brought suit in Suffolk Superior Court seeking 
$25,823.25 in damages for nonpayment of wine delivered. 26 Supreme 
acknowleged receipt of the wine but as a defense asserted that the goods 
were not merchantable due to the presence of the mold. 27 In addition, 
Supreme counterclaimed, demanding incidental and consequential dam-
ages arising from earlier, similarly spoiled shipments which, according to 
Supreme, destroyed the company's reputation and forced it into liqui-
dation. 28 The case was referred, facts not final, to a master. 29 The master 
found Delano responsible for the presence of Fresno mold and accord-
ingly awarded damages to Supreme. 3° For the most part, the damages 
awarded reflected Supreme's loss of profits on the sale of the bad wine. 31 
17 /d. 
18 /d. at 670, 473 N.E.2d at 1069. 
19 /d. at 670, 473 N.E.2d at 1069-70. 
20 /d. at 671, 473 N.E.2d at 1070. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. at 668, 671, 473 N .E.2d at 1068, 1070. 
"/d. at 668, 473 N.E.2d at 1068. 
26 /d. at 667, 473 N.E.2d at 1068. 
27 /d. at 667-68, 473 N.E.2d at 1068. 
28 /d. at 668, 473 N.E.2d at 1068. 
29 /d. at 668, 473 N.E.2d at 1069. The rules governing the appointment of masters in civil 
proceedings in Massachusetts are set forth in MAss. R. C1v. P. 53(a)-(h). 
30 Supreme Wine, 393 Mass. at 668, 473 N.E.2d at 1069. 
31 See id. at 679 n.6, 473 N.E.2d at 1074 n.6. The measure of damages included the lost 
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While the master also found that the unmerchantable wine caused Su-
preme's liquidation, because Supreme failed to carry its burden of proof, 
the master refused to award damages for loss of good will. 32 
At trial, the judge, relying on the master's findings, dismissed Delano's 
complaint. The judge also agreed with the master's determinations that 
Delano had breached its implied warranty as well as his assessment of 
$60,634.00 in damages largely representing lost profits. 33 Additionally, 
the trial judge found sufficient evidence of loss of good will and thus 
ordered $100,000.00 in compensationY 
On appeal, the superior court judgment was transferred directly from 
the appeals court to the Supreme Judicial Court, on its own motion. 35 
Delano argued several issues before the Court. First, Delano claimed 
that the judge applied the wrong standard in reviewing the master's report 
and improperly denied a motion to strike that report. 36 Also, Delano 
asserted that it did not violate the warranty of merchantability and in any 
event, Supreme failed to give the requisite timely and sufficient noticeY 
Finally, the appellant argued that the judge erred in his award of damages 
for loss of good will as well as his determination of the other consequen-
tial and incidental damages allowed. 38 In turn, Supreme cross-appealed 
insofar as it was required to deduct the purchase price of the last shipment 
of wine from its damages. 39 
On review, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Suffolk Superior 
Court decision.40 The Court affirmed each issue presented on appeal, 
including Delano's breach of implied warranty which ran with the sale 
of the sweet wine.41 The Court found that Supreme had met its burden 
of identifying the wine as Delano's and of proving that the presence of 
profits on 8,000 cases of wine ($104,000.00), payment for the cost to Supreme's reimburse-
ment of customers in returning the wine ($6,250.00), costs of rebottling and resale of the 
wine in accordance with Delano's recommendations ($25,207.25) and costs for reprocessing 
the wine ($21,000.00). From this total the judge deducted the amounts received for repro-
cessed wine ($70,000.00), and the amount of the unpaid shipment ($25,823.25). Thus, total 
damages other than good will equaled $60,634.00. Id. 
32 /d. at 668, 473 N.E.2d at 1069. 
33 See id. at 669, 473 N.E.2d at 1069. 
34Jd. 
35 ld. 
36Jd. 
37 ld. 
38Jd. 
39 Id. See also supra note 32 for a discussion of the calculation of damages other than 
good will. 
40 ld. at 667, 473 N.E.2d at 1068. 
41 The Court affirmed the other issues on appeal as well including the standard of review 
of the master's findings and the calculation of the damages other than those representing 
good will. ld. at 671-84, 473 N.E.2d at 1070-77. 
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the mold rendered the wine unmerchantable.42 The Court emphasized 
that the course of dealing between the respective parties since 1968 in 
which Supreme had always followed the same procedures and never 
before experienced difficulty, controlled this issue. 43 Consequently, the 
Court rejected Delano's arguments that the wine was merchantable be-
cause all California sweet wine contained Fresno mold and that trade 
usage requires the buyer-bottler to add sulfur dioxide to inhibit further 
growth of the mold. Based on this reasoning, the Court affirmed the 
lower court's finding of a breach of implied warranty of merchantability. 
Where a seller has breached an implied warranty of merchantability, 
the buyer is required in accordance with General Laws, chapter 106, 
section 2-607, to inform the seller of the breach.44 Addressing this issue, 
the Court held that notice is sufficient where it fulfills the purpose of the 
section of allowing an opportunity for settlement and alerting the seller 
that the buyer is asserting its legal rights.45 On the question of whether 
Supreme offered proper notice, the Court ruled that Supreme's ongoing 
oral and written communications were not as a matter of law, insufficient 
and untimely notification.46 Thus, according to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the trial judge could have found that Supreme's conduct consti-
tuted sufficient notice.4~ 
After affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues of breach of 
warranty and sufficient notice, the Court considered the award of 
$100,000.00 in damages for loss of good will. Although neither party 
raised the question of whether such damages are proper under General 
Laws, chapter 106, section 2-715, the Court nonetheless expressly ad-
dressed this issue. 48 In its examination, the Court referred to the case 
law permitting good will damages for breach of implied warranty before 
the adoption of the Code in Massachusetts.49 The Court recognized, 
however, that some jurisdictions following the Code prohibit recovery 
for loss of good will based on their own pre-Code case law and the 
speculative nature of such damages. 5° Finally, the Court noted that where 
good will damages were recovered, there was adequate evidence to show 
that the injury arose from the breach and that the amount of the damage 
42 /d. at 673-74, 473 N.E.2d at 1071-72. 
43 Id. at 673, 473 N.E.2d at 1071. For a definition of course of dealing and its effect on 
the standard of merchantability see G.L. c. 106, § 1-205(4). 
44 G.L. c. 106, § 2-607. See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 2-607:25-34. 
45 Supreme Wine, 393 Mass. at 675, 473 N.E.2d at 1072. 
46 /d. at 675, 473 N.E.2d at 1073. 
47 /d. 
48 /d. at 683, 473 N.E.2d at 1077. 
49 /d. at 683-84, 473 N.E.2d at 1077. 
50 /d. at 683, 473 N.E.2d at 1077. 
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could be calculated. 51 The Court concluded that damages for loss of good 
will are proper where there is adequate evidence to show that the injury 
arose from the breach and that the amount of this damage can be cal-
culated. 52 
Examining the facts of the case, the Supreme Judicial Court found the 
award proper since there was sufficient evidence both to support a causal 
connection between Delano's breach and damage to Supreme's business 
reputation and to justify a calculation of the resulting loss of good will. 53 
The Court first found that the record supported the contention that the 
bad wine was responsible for the injury to Supreme's business reputa-
tion. 54 In addition to the testimony of former Supreme officers and cus-
tomers, the evidence at trial included the master's report which found 
that the defective wine was the primary reason for Supreme's subsequent 
decline in sales after 1973.55 Based on this evidence, the Court concluded 
that the finding of a link between the breach and loss of good will by the 
trial court was not clearly erroneous.56 
Once the Court affirmed the connection between the qefective wine 
and loss of good will, it also refused to disturb the trialjudge's calculation 
of the amount of this loss. 57 On appeal, Delano attacked this valuation 
by asserting both that there was a lack of evidence to support the judge's 
appraisal of the damage, and that the judge relied on extraneous material 
in determining the value of the good will loss. 58 In response, noting 
initially that Delano offered no evidence in rebuttal, the Court reviewed 
the record and concluded that the valuation of $100,000.00 was appro-
priate in light of the evidence presented. 59 At trial, the evidence offered 
included, among other information, expert testimony by a wine broker 
who valued Supreme's loss of good will in excess of $300,000.00, based 
on business records and posed hypotheticals.60 Not being bound by ex-
pert testimony, the judge determined through the use of evidence con-
tained in the record and an examination of the various valuation methods 
presented that Supreme's ioss of good will attributable to Delano's breach 
was $100,000.00.61 The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the valuation, 
noting that it need not be based on mathematical certainty and that the 
51 /d. 
52 See id. at 683, 684, 473 N.E.2d at 1076, 1077. 
53 /d. at 684, 473 N.E.2d at 1077. 
54 /d. at 681, 473 N.E.2d at 1075-76. 
55 /d. 
56 /d. at 681, 473 N.E.2d at 1076. 
57 /d. at 681-82, 473 N.E.2d at 1076-77. 
58 /d. at 681, 682, 473 N.E.2d at 1076. 
59 /d. 
60 See id. at 682, 473 N.E.2d at 1076-77. 
61 /d. 
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judge's weighing of the evidence, as with the earlier proof of a connection 
between the breach and the sustained damage, was not clearly erro-
neous. 62 Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's findings of dam-
ages for loss of good will as being based upon a sufficiency of evidence.63 
The resolution of the award of good will damages is significant in 
several respects. First, the Court explicitly held that good will damages 
will not be prohibited as a matter of law but instead will be awarded for 
breach of implied warranty in appropriate situations. In this respect, 
although there is authority to the contrary, Massachusetts joins several 
jurisdictions that have squarely confronted the issue. 64 Also, Supreme 
Wine sets out the circumstances where the award of good will damages 
will be appropriate - there must be adequate evidence to establish both 
that the breach caused the injury to good will and the value of the loss 
of good will. Through these requirements of sufficient evidence, Massa-
chusetts seems to address the concerns of jurisdictions which prohibit 
recovery as a matter of law because such damages are too speculative. 
The position taken by the Court in Supreme Wine seems preferable to 
those jurisdictions which unconditionally bar recovery of good will since 
there is a possibility of recovery for good will damages when these 
damages are justified by the evidence. And theoretically, good will dam-
ages will not be awarded where there is insufficient evidence. 
Where courts do not prohibit recovery as a matter of law, they must 
address the difficult task of evaluating the evidence of loss of good will. 
Engaged in such an inquiry, these courts often have prohibited recovery 
for lack of sufficiency of evidence. In many of these cases, the evidence 
either failed to establish a relationship between the broken agreement 
and the later loss, or inadequately supported a reasonable calculation of 
damages. 65 
Concerning the connection between the breach and loss of good will, 
in Supreme Wine there seemed to be adequate evidence to support a link 
between the defective product and the buyer's loss. This evidence in-
cluded the testimony of several employees and customers as well as a 
finding of the seller's responsibility by the master who reviewed the 
facts. 66 In its ruling, the Court intimated that it would leave determination 
of this connection largely within the discretion of the factfinder as long 
as the record was not completely devoid of supporting evidenceY 
Beyond the issue of whether the loss of good will is sufficiently related 
62 /d. at 683, 473 N.E.2d at 1077. 
63 /d. at 684, 473 N.E.2d at 1077. 
64 See supra note 7. See also 96 A.L.R.3d § 18[a], 395 (2d ed. 1979). 
65 See supra note 8. See also 96 A.L.R.3d § 18[b], 397-98. 
66 Supreme Wine, 393 Mass. at 681, 473 N.E.2d at 1075-76. 
67 /d. at 681, 473 N.E.2d at 1076. 
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to a breach of warranty according to U.C.C. section 2-715, a court must 
be able to determine the amount of damages. 68 In specific cases, courts 
have held that there was insufficient evidence to calculate the amount of 
alleged damage to good will and that any award by the factfinder would 
be pure speculation. 69 For example, in a case applying Michigan law 
where owners of a "fish ranch" purchased diseased fish, the buyers failed 
to prove the profitability of their business or assign any kind of good will 
value to it. 70 The court held that it would be sheer speculation on the 
part of the jury "to attempt to establish damages due to alleged loss of 
good will."71 In another decision denying good will recovery as specu-
lative, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that good will is recoverable 
only to the extent that the evidence affords an estimation of damages 
with reasonable certainty. 72 In that case, although evidence existed that 
the buyer faced some resistance by potential customers as the result of 
a defective trailer sold, the court held that it was impossible to determine 
whether any actual orders were foregone due to the incidentY 
In contrast to cases requiring a certain level of accuracy in their val-
uation, the determination of good will damages in Supreme Wine seems 
to allow a less precise measurement. In his calculation of this value, the 
trial judge, according to the Supreme Judicial Court, disregarded the 
expert testimony and the testimony offered by the company's president, 
and reached his own formulation based upon the evidence in the record. 74 
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the amount of the award as not clearly 
erroneous stating that the factfinder was not bound by expert opinion 
and that damages need not be proven with mathematical certainty.75 
The broad latitude granted the trial court in Supreme Wine, has at least 
some support in Massachusetts case law.76 In Matsushita Elecrric Cor-
poration, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's valuation 
of good will loss where the trial judge did not set forth the details of his 
computations which were based generally on the evidence.77 The Su-
preme Judicial Court supported its holding in part by reference to Com-
ment 1 to section 1-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code: "[damages] 
68 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. 
69 See Chrysler Corp. v. E. Shavitz & Sons, 536 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1967); see also 
% A.L.R.3d at 396. 
70 Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1979). 
71 ld. 
72 Kwipco, Inc. v. General Trailer Co., 267 Or. 184, 515 P.2d 1317 (1973). 
73 See id. at 187, 515 P.2d at 1319-20. 
74 Supreme Wine, 393 Mass. at 682, 473 N.E.2d at 1076. 
75 /d. at 682-83, 473 N.E.2d at 1077. 
76 See Matsushita Electric Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp., 362 Mass. 246, 284 N.E.2d 
880 (1972). 
n ld. at 263, 284 N.E.2d at 889. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1985 [1985], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1985/iss1/5
§ 1.2 CONTRACTS 21 
have to be proved with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts 
permit but no more. "78 
In conclusion, the award of damages for loss of good will as the result 
of a breach of implied warranty of merchantability is permitted under 
General Laws, chapter 106. This position is consistent with several other 
jurisdictions allowing such damages. Although good will damages may 
be inherently speculative, the Massachusetts courts can guard against 
unwarranted awards by ensuring that there is a sufficient basis in the 
evidence for a finding of a connection between the breach and the re-
sulting damage to business reputation as well as adequate grounds for 
the calculation of these damages. While the courts that allow good will 
damages require differing levels of proof, in Supreme Wine the Court 
ruled that it would not disturb a finding unless there was no support in 
the record. In allowing such damages where they can be proven, Supreme 
Wine is consistent with the liberal recovery posture of the U.C.C. 
§ 1.2. Measure of Damages--Breach of Contract to Purchase Real Es-
tate.* The traditional measure of damages for a purchaser's breach of a 
contract to purchase real estate is the difference between the contract 
price and the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach. 1 
A minority of jurisdictions, however, have developed a caveat to this 
rule to allow recovery of the actual losses sustained by the vendor as a 
result of a breach when the losses are reasonably foreseeable or within 
the contemplation of the parties. 2 During the Survey year, in American 
78 /d. at 264, 284 N.E.2d at 890. 
*Jeffrey Hadden, staff member ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 1.2. 1 Capaldi v. Burlwood Realty Corp., 350 Mass. 765, 765, 214 N.E.2d 71, 72 
(1966); Rozene v. Sverid, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 461, 465-66, 351 N.E.2d 541, 545 (1976). See 
also 5 CORBIN ON CoNTRACTS § 1098A (1964) (In the case of breach by the purchaser of 
an executory contract to buy land, the vendor's damages are the full contract price minus 
the market value of the land at date of breach and also minus any payment received); II 
WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTS § 1399 (3d ed. 1968) (where the purchaser of land makes total 
default, the general rule allows recovery of the difference between the contract price and 
the market price). 
2 See Roper v. Milbourn, 93 Neb. 809, 814, 142 N.W. 792, 794 (1913) (in an action for a 
breach of a contract for the sale of real estate, the court permitted vendor to recover 
damages fairly within the contemplation of the parties at the time they made their contract 
including profits which were within the contemplation of the parties); Brewer v. Vanek, 
No. 84-CA-56, Slip Op. (Ohio Ct. App., February 21, 1985) (court held that vendor entitled 
to recover actual damages from vendee's breach of agreement to purchase real estate 
including reasonably foreseeable losses from breach due to foreclosure sale); Borton v. 
Medicine Rock Land Co., 275 Or. 59, 67, 549 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1976) (court held that vendor 
was entitled to recover loss sustained by a forced sale of its land because such a loss was 
within the contemplation of the parties and was directly caused by vendee's misconduct); 
Senior Estates, Inc. v. Bauman Homes, Inc., 272 Or. 577, 583-92, 539 P.2d 142, 145-49 
(1975) (vendor may recover, in addition to his loss of bargain damages all those damages 
9
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Mechanical Corporation v. Union Machine Company of Lynn, Inc., 3 the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court established that the correct measure of 
damages for a buyer's breach of a contract to purchase real estate is the 
full amount of the actual loss including those damages which reasonably 
are to be expected as the probable result of the breach of the purchase 
agreement. 4 
The dispute in American Mechanical concerned an action brought by 
a vendor of property against the purchaser after the deal fell through. 5 
In American Mechanical, the plaintiff, American Mechanical Corporation 
(American) owned property which it used to conduct a precision machine 
parts manufacturing business.6 American, however, was in arrears on its 
loan payments and the bank which held the mortgage on the property 
was pressing American to sell the business.7 In September of 1976, 
American commenced negotiations with the defendant, Union Machine 
Company of Lynn, Inc. (Union), for the sale of American's real estate, 
machinery, and equipment.8 American informed Union that it was selling 
the property because of financial difficulties and the pressure from the 
bank.9 
On October 16, 1976, the parties reached an agreement for the sale of 
the real estate, machinery, and equipment. 10 Union gave American a 
check for $5,000. 11 The terms of the agreement, which were printed on 
the back of the check, provided that Union would buy the real estate, 
machinery, and equipment for $135,000 contingent upon Union's obtain-
ing a $90,000 mortgage and upon American's ability to convey free and 
clear titleY Two days later, without informing American, Union stopped 
which are contemplated by the parties and which are a natural and proximate result of the 
vendee's breach including interest on unpaid balance of purchase price, property taxes, 
and the wages, payroll taxes and advertising expenses incurred to resell property). In other 
jurisdictions, the usual rule for measuring damages for a buyer's breach of a real estate 
purchase and sale agreement is the difference between the contract price and the price 
obtained on resale. See Green v. Ansley, 92 Ga. 647, 648-49, 19 S.E. 53, 53 (1893); Tator 
v. Salem, 81 A.D.2d 727, 727-28, 439 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498-99 (1981); Harris v. Dawson, 479 
Pa. 463, 466, 388 A.2d 748, 749 (1978); Clever v. Clever, 38 Pa. Super. 66, 75 (1909). See 
also Uniform Land Transactions Act § 2-504 (1980). 
• 3 21 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 485 N.E.2d 680 (1985). 
4 Id. at 102-03, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
5 Id. at 98, 485 N.E.2d at 681. 
6 Id. at 98, 485 N.E.2d at 682. 
7 ld. 
8 Id. 
9 ld. 
10 ld. 
II Jd. 
12 Id. at 98-99, 485 N.E.2d at 682. 
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payment on the check. 13 Shortly thereafter, Union representatives visited 
the premises and spoke with a bank regarding a mortgage for the prop-
erty.14 During this period, American was phasing out its business and 
referred several new business orders to Union. 15 
On November 1, 1976, Union informed American that Union would 
not go through with the deal. 16 American immediately informed the bank 
holding the mortgage on the property and the bank in turn instructed 
American to cease operations. 17 The bank then took possession of the 
property and sold the machinery for $35,000. 18 Finally, on June 1, 1977, 
the bank sold the real estate at a foreclosure sale for $55,000. 19 
American brought an action against Union based upon an alleged 
breach of contract and violation of chapter 93A of the General Laws of 
Massachusetts. 20 The trial court found that Union had breached the 
contract to purchase American's property. 21 However, the judge con-
cluded that although there was a breach of contract, the right to recovery 
was limited to nominal damages. 22 The trial judge followed the traditional 
measure of damages for breach of a contract to purchase real estate -
the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of 
the property at the time of the breach. 23 The trial court was unconvinced, 
however, that the price for the property at the foreclosure sale seven 
months after the buyer's breach represented the fair market value at the 
13 /d. at 99, 485 N.E.2d at 682. 
14 /d. 
15fd. 
16fd. 
17 /d. 
18Jd. 
19 /d. The bank purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and a representative of 
Union was present. /d. 
20 /d. at 98, 485 N.E.2d at 681. Chapter 93A, section 2 provides that: "[u]nfair methods 
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce are ... unlawful." G.L. c. 93A, § 2(a). Chapter 93A, sections 9 and II provide 
remedies to any person injured by another person's act which is illegal under this chapter. 
/d. §§ 9, II. Section II permits any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce and who suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of 
another's violation of this chapter or the rules promulgated thereunder, to bring an action 
in superior court for damages and such equitable relief the court deems necessary and 
proper. /d. § II. At trial, Union contended that the writing on the back of the check was 
insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 
99, 485 N .E.2d at 682. Union also took the position that since Union had failed to obtain 
financing, the mortgage contingency had not been satisfied. /d. The trial judge rejected 
both these arguments. /d. 
21 ld. 
22 /d. at 98, 485 N.E.2d at 681-82. 
23 See supra note I. 
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time of the breach. 24 Moreover, the judge found that the plaintiff failed 
to introduce other evidence regarding the property's fair market value.25 
Accordingly, applying the traditional rule of damages for a breach of a 
contract to purchase real estate, the trial court ruled that American failed 
to show actual damages. 26 American appealed the superior court decision 
claiming that American should have been awarded more than nominal 
damages on its contract claim27 and that the chapter 93A claim should 
have been decided on its merits.28 
On review, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that American was 
entitled to damages for its full actual losses in the amount of the difference 
between the contract price and the amount received for the property at 
the foreclosure sale. 29 In so holding, the Appeals Court first pointed out 
that the general aim in measuring damages for a breach of contract is to 
place the non-breaching party in as good a position as he would have 
been in had the contract been performed.30 The court also noted that an 
24 American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 100, 485 N.E.2d at 683. The Appeals 
Court noted that the foreclosure sale price was only evidence of the property's market 
value and was not binding as the market value of the property on the date of the breach. 
ld. The Appeals Court also noted, however, that when the sale of a piece of property 
occurs through an arms-length transaction, the sale price is strong evidence of the market 
price. Id. The Appeals Court concluded that the foreclosure sale was conducted properly. 
ld. at 100-01, 485 N.E.2d at 683. 
25 Id. at 100, 485 N.E.2d at 683. 
26 Id. at 101, 485 N.E.2d at 683. The judge also concluded that in absence of proof of a 
demand letter, recovery under chapter 93A was limited to section II remedies which were 
not pleaded. ld. at 98, 485 N.E.2d at 682. 
27 I d. at 99, 485 N.E.2d at 682. For a discussion of the Appeals Court's treatment of the 
breach of contract claim, see infra text accompanying notes 29-57. 
28 American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 99, 485 N.E.2d at 682. The trial court 
held that in the absence of proof of a demand letter, recovery under chapter 93A could 
only be made under section II of that chapter and that American failed to plead a violation 
of section II. I d. at 98, 485 N .E.2d at 682. The Appeals Court disagreed with the trial 
court on the chapter 93A issue and remanded that count to the superior court for finding 
of fact, conclusions of Jaw and entry of judgment on that count. I d. at 104-05, 485 N.E.2d 
at 685. The Appeals Court held that recovery under chapter 93A, section II is not condi-
tioned upon sending a demand letter. I d. The Appeals Court further held that the complaint 
alleged facts from which it may be inferred that the parties were engaged in trade or 
commerce, and that the complaint stated all the other necessary elements of a valid claim 
under section II. ld. at 104, 485 N.E.2d at 685. The Appeals Court found that there was 
sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find that Union had committed unfair and deceptive 
practices. I d. Accordingly, the Appeals Court found that dismissal of the chapter 93A count 
without a decision on the merits was improper. Id. at 104-05, 485 N.E.2d at 685. 
29 Id. at 102-03, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
30 ld. See Laurin v. DeCarolis Construction Co., 372 Mass. 688, 691-93, 363 N.E.2d 675, 
678-79 (1977) (where vendors of property breached a contract for purchase and sale of the 
land by removing gravel from property without purchasers' consent, the purchasers were 
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important aspect of this principle of contract law is to determine whether 
the non-breaching party suffered an actual loss of such a nature that such 
loss was reasonably foreseeable by the parties or actually within their 
contemplation at the time of the contract. 31 In light of these principles, 
the court noted, the traditional measure of damages relied upon by the 
trial judge may not always be appropriate. Therefore, the court held that 
the actual loss from a breach may be recovered in an action for damages. 32 
The Appeals Court then concluded that there is no logical reason for 
applying a different rule for damages in actions for breaches of real estate 
purchase and sale agreements from that rule applied to determine dam-
ages in contract actions generally. 33 The court reasoned that the tradi-
tional rule for measuring damages in actions for breaches of real estate 
purchase and sale agreements34 is merely a formulation of the general 
rule for measuring contract damages. 35 When these formulas represent 
the injured party's actual loss, the court noted, they afford the non-
breaching party an adequate remedy. 36 However, in some cases, the court 
concluded, the actual loss suffered as a result of a breach exceeds the 
amount yielded by the traditional formula - contract price minus the 
market value at the time of breach. 37 Therefore, the court concluded that 
in cases involving real estate, the general rule of contract damages which 
gives recognition to actual losses sustained as a result of a breach should 
be applied when the losses are reasonably foreseeable or within the 
contemplation of the parties. 38 The Appeals Court noted that such a rule 
entitled to the value of the gravel as it lay in the land); The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts provides that a purpose of the judicial remedies under the Restatement rules is 
to protect a promisee's '"expectation interest,' which is his interest in having the benefit 
of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract 
been performed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 (1979). 
31 American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 101, 485 N.E.2d at 683. 
32 /d. See Monadnock Display Fireworks, Inc. v. Town of Andover, 388 Mass. 153, 157-
58, 445 N.E.2d 1053, 1056-57 (1983) (court allowed corporation which presented fireworks 
display that injured a boy to indemnify town because the loss could be ascertained to have 
followed as a natural consequence and to have been within the contemplation of the parties 
as a probable result of the town's breach of a contract to employ reasonable measures to 
control the crowd); Stein v. Almeder, 253 Mass. 200, 204-05, 148 N.E. 441, 442 (1925) 
(court awarded purchaser of bad apples total loss for forty-eight barrels rather than differ-
ence in value of the apples at the time of delivery and the value they would have had if 
answering to the warranty because when the defendant vendor sold the apples, he knew 
that they were subject to condemnation and forfeiture). 
33 American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 101, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
34 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
3' American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 101-02, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
36 /d. at 102, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. at 102-03, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
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has been adopted by other jurisdictions where the traditional rule pro-
duced inadequate remedies. 39 
In adopting this rule for measuring damages in real estate contract 
cases, the Appeals Court relied upon a recent Ohio Appeals Court de-
cision, Brewer v. Vanek, which involved facts nearly identical to those 
at issue in American Mechanica/.40 The Ohio trial court entered a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs for $1,000, such amount being the difference 
between the contract price and the market value of the property at the 
time of the breach.41 The Ohio Appeals Court reversed the judgment and 
remanded the case for reassessment of damages because the rule relied 
upon by the trial court did not provide an adequate remedy. 42 The Appeals 
Court in Brewer held that because the purchaser's breach was voluntary 
and because the purchaser was aware of the probable consequences of 
her actions, the foreclosure sale, additional damages which were reason-
ably to be expected by the breach should be included in the award.43 
Applying the approach outlined by the Ohio court to Union's breach 
of the purchase and sale agreement, the American Mechanical court 
found that at the time Union and American entered into the contract, 
Union knew that if the sale of the property did not go through, the result 
would be that the bank would enforce its rights under the mortgage and 
that a foreclosure sale was likely.44 Accordingly, the Appeals Court ruled 
that the correct measure of damages, on traditional contract principles, 
was the full amount of the actual loss or, in this case, the contract price 
minus the amount received at the foreclosure sale. 45 
The Appeals Court also held that general contract principles required 
the damages be reduced to the extent that American could reasonably 
39 I d. at 102, 485 N .E.2d at 684. See supra note 2 for a partial list of the courts adopting 
this approach. 
40 Brewer v. Vaneck, No. 84-CA-56, Slip Op. (Ohio Ct. App., February 21, 1985). In 
Brewer, the plaintiffs entered a contract to sell their home to the defendant for $63,000. /d. 
After the defendant refused to purchase the home, the property was sold by the sheriff at 
a foreclosure sale for $42,700 because the plaintiffs were in arrears on a mortgage loan. /d. 
41 Brewer, No. 84-CA-56, Slip Op. (Ohio Ct. App., February 21, 1985). 
42 (d. 
43 Id. 
44 American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 102, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
45 !d. at 102-03, 485 N .E.2d at 684. The Appeals Court vacated the trial court judgment 
and entered a final judgment for the plaintiff on the breach of contract count in the amount 
of $45,000 with interest. ld. at 105, 485 N.E.2d at 685. The Appeals Court found that 
American had sustained an actual loss of $45,000, the difference between the contract price 
of$135,000 and the $90,000 received from the foreclosure sale, and the sale ofthe machinery 
and equipment. Id. at 102, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
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have avoided the loss. 46 Thus, the court examined whether American 
could have taken reasonable steps to sell the property to someone else 
prior to the foreclosure saleY The court concluded that the evidence 
supported a finding that American was unable to secure another pur-
chaser for the property. 48 According to the court, the burden of proving 
that losses could have been avoided rests with the breaching party, and 
Union had not met its burden of proof. 49 Therefore, the court held that 
there was no basis for reducing the damages to which American was 
entitled.50 
American Mechanical clarifies the rule for measuring damages in 
breach of contract cases involving the sale of real estate by eliminating 
the distinction between damages for the breach of a contract to purchase 
real estate and damages for breach of a contract to purchase goods. Many 
courts agree that there is no logic&l basis for making such a distinction. 5 1 
The new rule articulated by the Appeals Court provides that a non-
breaching vendor of real estate may recover in an action for damages the 
actual losses sustained as a result of the breach which are reasonably 
foreseeable or within the contemplation of the parties. 52 This rule 
properly assigns the economic burden created by a breach upon the party 
at fault. 53 Moreover, this approach is consistent with the general principle 
of contract law that the non-breaching party is entitled to the benefit of 
the contract bargain. 54 
46 /d. at 103, 485 N.E.2d at 684. Section 350 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
states: 
(I) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recoverable for loss that the 
injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation. 
(2) The injured party is not precluded from recovery by the rule stated in Subsection 
(1) to the extent that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350 (1979). 
47 American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 103, 485 N .E.2d at 684-85. 
48 /d. The Appeals Court noted that the bank moved quickly to take possession of the 
property. /d. at 103, 485 N.E.2d at 685. Moreover, the court found that the property was 
not of the nature that a ready market for its sale was available. /d. 
49 /d. at 103-04, 485 N.E.2d at 685. See also Clark v. General Cleaning Co., 345 Mass. 
62, 65, 185 N.E.2d 749, 751 (1962); Food Specialties, Inc. v. John C. Dowd, Inc., 339 
Mass. 735, 748, 162 N.E.2d 276, 283 (1959); Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 200 
Mass. I, 6, 85 N.E. 877, 879 (1908); Nat'l Medical Care, Inc. v. Zigelbaum, 18 Mass. App. 
Ct. 570, 581, 468 N.E.2d 868, 876 (1984). 
50 American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 103-04, 485 N.E.2d at 685. 
51 See supra note 2 for courts adopting a single approach to measuring damages for 
breach of real estate contracts and contracts generally. 
52 American Mechanical, 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 102-03, 485 N.E.2d at 684. 
53 See Brewer, No. 84--CA-56, Slip Op. (Ohio Ct. App., February 21, 1985) (bland 
application of the traditional rule on real estate contract damages would require a complete 
disregard of the element of fault). 
54 See supra note 35. 
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The measure of damages adopted in American Mechanical is especially 
appropriate in real estate transactions which ultimately result in foreclo-
sure sales. If the seller is forced to sell the property because of financial 
difficulties, such a seller is rarely in a position to enforce specific perfor-
mance of the contract. ss Moreover, the seller who is forced into foreclo-
sure by the purchaser's breach loses control over the sale of the property 
and cannot ensure that the market price will be obtained at the foreclosure 
sale. In the extreme case, the breaching vendee could purchase the 
property at the foreclosure sale, which occurred because of his default, 
at a price substantially below the contract price. s6 
When a purchaser enters an agreement to buy real estate from a vendor 
in financial difficulty, such purchasers generally know that the probable 
result of the purchaser's breach is a foreclosure sale. Therefore, the 
breach of a purchase and sale agreement involving a vendor in financial 
trouble often results in losses which are reasonably foreseeable or within 
the contemplation of the partiesY In these cases, the breaching party is 
protected from abuse of this rule by the condition that the seller must 
take reasonable steps to avoid the loss.ss In sum, when a resulting fore-
closure is reasonably foreseeable or within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of contracting, the loss generated by a forced sale 
should be borne by the party at fault. 
§ 1.3. Liability of Repudiating Seller-Materiality of Buyer's Financial 
Position.* Until recently, some doubt remained as to whether a buyer in 
Massachusetts could recover damages from a repudiating seller despite 
the buyer's inability to fulfill his or her contractual obligations. An early 
line of cases, beginning with Lowe v. Harwood1 in 1885, stood for the 
proposition that a repudiating seller is liable for damages to a buyer who 
55 One justification for the distinction between recovery in the case of goods and the case 
of land is that in real estate transactions, the vendor can unquestionably get specific 
performance in equity. See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1399 (3d ed. 1968). 
$6 In American Mechanical, a representative of Union was present at the foreclosure sale 
at which the property was sold for $55,000. 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 99, 485 N.E.2d. at 682. 
Accordingly, if Union had purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, it could have 
obtained the property for $56,000- the $55,000 foreclosure sale price plus the $1,000 
nominal damages awarded by the trial judge applying the traditional test for real estate 
damages. See id. at 100-01, 485 Mass. at 683. 
57 A basic condition to recovery under the rule adopted by the Appeals Court is that the 
consequences of the breach are foreseeable or within the contemplation of the parties at 
the time of entering into the contract. See id. at 101, 102-03,485 N.E.2d at 683,684. 
"See id. at 103, 485 N.E.2d at 684-85. 
*Elizabeth M. Leonard, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 1.3. 1 Lowe v. Harwood, 139 Mass. 133, 29 N.E. 538 (1885). 
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could not have carried out his or her end of the bargain. 2 Lowe involved 
a defendant farmer who repudiated a contract to trade farms with the 
plaintiff and who subsequently sold the farm to another buyer. 3 The 
Supreme Judicial Court in Lowe found that the ability of the plaintiff to 
meet his end of the bargain was irrelevant to his breach of contract 
action4 and held that the defendant's repudiation of the contract excused 
the plaintiff from making any tender and established a breach of contract. 5 
Two subsequent decisions, Foternick v. Watson6 in 1903 and Hawkes v. 
Kehoe7 in 1907, recognized the Lowe decision as authority for the prin-
ciple that a buyer need not prove his ability to perform under the contract 
in order to maintain a breach of contract action against a repudiating 
seller.8 
Later Massachusetts case law demonstrates diminished regard for the 
Lowe principle. In the 1911 case Beach & C/arridge Co. v. American 
Steam Gauge & Valve Mfg. Co., 9 the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts held that the seller was entitled to recover from the repudiating 
buyer because the jury-could infer that had the buyer not repudiated the 
contract, the seller would have been able to carry out his part of the 
agreement. 10 Similarly, the Appeals Court in Thomas v. Christensen 11 
held that the buyer was not required to complete his obligations under 
the contract once the seller had repudiated the contract. 12 Instead, the 
court held that all the buyer would have to show is that he would have 
been able to purchase the shares if the seller had not repudiated the 
contract. 13 These Massachusetts cases reflect the majority rule in this 
country that the financial ability of the injured party is a material issue 
in the action for damages against the repudiating party for breach of 
contract. 14 
2 Lowe, 139 Mass. at 135, 29 N.E. at 539; see also Hawkes v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 
427, 79 N.E. 766, 768 (1907); Foternick v. Watson, 184 Mass. 187, 193-94, 68 N.E. 215, 
217-18 (1903). 
3 Lowe, 139 Mass. at 134, 29 N.E. at 538. 
4 /d. at 135, 29 N.E. at 539. 
5 /d. at 135-36, 29 N.E. at 539. 
6 184 Mass. 187, 68 N.E. 215 (1903). 
7 193 Mass. 419, 79 N.E. 766 (1907). 
8 Hawkes, 193 Mass. at 427, 79 N.E. at 768; Foternick, 184 Mass. at 193-94,68 N.E. at 
217-18. 
9 208 Mass. 121, 94 N.E. 457 (1911). 
10 !d. at 132, 94 N.E. at 458. 
11 12 Mass. App. Ct. 169, 422 N.E.2d 472 (1981). 
12 /d. at 177, 422 N.E.2d at 478. 
13 /d. at 178, 422 N.E.2d at 478. 
14 See, e.g., Dennis v. McLean, 53 Or. App. 282, 289, 631 P.2d 839, 843 (1981); Spartans 
Indus., Inc. v. John Pilling Shoe Co., 385 F.2d 495, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1%7); Strasbourger v. 
Leerburger, 233 N.Y. 55, 60, 134 N.E. 834, 836 (1922). 
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During the Survey year, in Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co., 15 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court disapproved the Lowe line of 
cases and held that the financial ability of an injured party to perform is 
relevant to his claim for damages against the repudiating party for breach 
of contract. 16 In addition, the Court held that the burden of proof in such 
circumstances falls on the plaintiff to demonstrate ability to perform. 17 
Kanavos involved an option contract between the plaintiff, Harold J. 
Kanavos and the defendant, Hancock Bank & Trust Company. 18 The 
bank had given Kanavos the right to acquire all the stock of 1025 Han-
cock, Inc., a corporation owning a fourteen-story apartment building. 19 
Later, the option contract was amended when the executive vice presi-
dent of the bank offered Kanavos $40,000 and a right of last refusal in 
exchange for Kanavos' surrender of his option. 20 The bank subsequently 
sold the stock to a third party without giving Kanavos notice and oppor-
tunity to exercise the option to match the offer and purchase the stock. 21 
The plaintiff, Kanavos, sued in the superior court for breach of con-
tract.22 The superior court allowed the bank's motion for a directed 
verdict. 23 On the plaintiff's appeal, the Appeals Court reversed the su-
perior court, invalidating the directed verdict. 24 The bank then appealed 
the case to the Supreme Judicial Court, which denied review of the 
Appeals Court's decision to reverse the directed verdict. 25 On remand, 
the superior court held that the ability of Kanavos to pay the purchase 
price was not material to his action for damages. 26 The bank appealed 
and the Supreme Judicial Court, after transferring the case on its own 
initiative, held first that the right to recover in a breach of contract action 
depended on the financial ability of the injured party to perform under 
the contract27 and, second, that the burden was on the injured party to 
prove his or her ability to fulfill the obligations of the contract. 28 
In discussing whether the buyer's financial ability is material in a 
"395 Mass. 199, 479 N.E.2d 168 (1985). 
16 /d. at 204, 479 N.E.2d at 171. 
17 /d. at 205, 479 N.E.2d at 172. 
18 /d. at 200, 479 N.E.2d at 169. 
19Jd. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 326, 326-27, 439 N.E.2d 
311, 312 (1982). 
23 /d. at 327, 439 N.E.2d at 312. 
24 /d. at 333, 439 N.E.2d at 316. 
25 Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co., 387 Mass. 1103, 440 N.E.2d 1177 (Sept. 30, 
1982). 
26 Kanavos, 395 Mass. at 201, 479 N.E.2d at 170. 
27 /d. at 204, 479 N.E.2d at 171. 
28 /d. at 205, 479 N.E.2d at 172. 
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breach of contract action, the Court began by stating that the general 
rule governing contracts which involve concurrent obligations is that one 
party may not put another party in default unless that party has shown 
an ability to perform through some offer of performance. 29 However, a 
tender of performance is not required if the other party has shown an 
inability or refusal to perform. 30 Thus, in view of the facts of Kanavos, 
the Court stated that Kanavos was not required to make a meaningless 
offer of the purchase price because the bank had already sold the stock 
and thus was unable to perform under the contract. 31 
Although Kanavos was not obliged to tender the purchase price once 
the bank had repudiated the agreement, the Court, relying on the majority 
rule in this country, held that Kanavos' ability to pay the purchase price 
remained a material issue in Kanavos' action for damages against the 
bank for its breach of contract. 32 Furthermore, the Court rejected Kan-
avos' reliance on Lowe v. Harwood as setting forth the principle that the 
financial ability of the buyer is irrelevant to his claim for damages against 
the repudiating seller. 33 Instead, the Court pointed to the Beach & Clar-
ridge Co. line of cases as authority for the materiality of the buyer's 
financial position in his or her action for damages under Massachusetts 
case law. 34 
The Court next considered whether the burden of proof should be 
placed on Kanavos to show his ability to perform or on the bank to show 
Kanavos' lack of ability to do so. 35 The general rule, according to the 
Court, places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove his or her 
ability to perform the obligations of the contract,36 although authority 
exists for placing the burden of proof on the defendant. 37 Reasoning that 
Kanavos' proof of his ability was essential to his claim and that he was 
more knowledgeable of his financial ability than the bank, the Court 
concluded that the burden was on Kanavos to prove his ability to pur-
chase the stock.38 In view of the inequity of placing on the defendant the 
burden of proving a fact essential to the plaintiff's case, the Court re-
jected the argument that the risk of failing to demonstrate Kanavos' 
inability should fall on the bank because the bank created the conflict. 39 
29 /d. at 202, 479 N.E.2d at 170. 
30 /d. 
31 /d. 
32 /d. 
33 /d. at 203-04, 479 N.E.2d at 171. 
34 /d. at 204, 479 N.E.2d at 171. 
35 /d. at 204-05, 479 N.E.2d at 171-72. 
36 !d. at 204, 479 N.E.2d at 172. 
37 Id. at 205, 479 N.E.2d at 172. 
38 /d. 
39 /d. 
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The Court remanded the case for a retrial on the issue whether Kanavos 
would have been able to purchase the stock during the option period had 
the bank given him proper notice of his right to exercise the option.40 
Well-supported by previous decisions, the Kanavos case removes any 
doubt as to the relevance of the buyer's financial ability to his or her 
claim for damages in a breach of contract action. Although the authority 
of the Lowe decision had been undermined by later Massachusetts 
cases,41 the Kanavos Court explicitly disapproves of prior cases which 
allowed a buyer to recover in a breach of contract action despite his or 
her inability to perform under the contract.42 The Kanavos Court cor-
rectly points out that although Kanavos was not obligated to perform 
once the bank had repudiated, Kanavos must demonstrate that had the 
bank complied with the agreement, he could have performed his end of 
the bargain.43 Because the promises of the agreement created concurrent 
obligations, Kanavos' tender of the purchase price for the stock was a 
condition to the bank's obligation to pay for them. 44 Thus, if Kanavos 
had been unable to pay for the stock, the bank's duty to sell the shares 
never would have arisen and Kanavos would have no right to recover. 
The Kanavos Court's holding that Kanavos must prove his ability to 
perform his obligations under the contract is consistent with prior Mas-
sachusetts case law. In cases involving conditions precedent, the Court 
has placed the burden on the plaintiff to show at least substantial perfor-
mance on its part in order to recover.45 Because it is only the time of 
performance which distinguishes conditions precedent from concurrent 
conditions, in keeping with these cases, the Kanavos Court was correct 
in placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff buyer. In addition, in the 
Thomas v. Christensen case, which, like Kanavos, involved concurrent 
obligations under an option contract, the Appeals Court stated that the 
40 Jd. at 206, 479 N.E.2d at 172. 
41 Thomas v. Christensen, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 169, 178, 422 N.E.2d 472, 478 (1981); 
Gomes v. Fagerberg, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 927, 928, 413 N.E.2d 343, 344 (1980); Beach & 
Clarridge Co. v. American Steam Gauge & Valve Mfg. Co., 208 Mass. 121, 132, 94 N.E. 
457' 458 (1911). 
42 Kanavos, 395 Mass. at 203-04, 479 N.E.2d at 171. 
43 Id. at 203, 479 N.E.2d at 171. 
44 See Farnsworth, The Problems of Non-Performance in Contract, 17 NEw ENG. L. 
REV. 249, 306 (1982). 
45 Previews v. Everets, 326 Mass. 333, 335, 94 N.E.2d 267, 268 (1950); Waldo Bros. v. 
Platt Contracting Co., 305 Mass. 349, 359, 25 N.E.2d 770, 774 (1940); Pye v. Perry, 217 
Mass. 68, 69, 104 N.E. 460, 461 (1914); Bennett v. Kupfer Bros., 213 Mass. 218, 221, 100 
N.E. 332, 333 (1913). 
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plaintiff must show that he would have been able to purchase the stock 
had the contract not been repudiated.46 
It is now clear, in view of the Kanavos decision, that the financial 
ability of a prospective buyer will be a material issue in an action for 
damages against a repudiating seller for breach of contract. Moreover, 
the plaintiff buyer will bear the burden of proof in establishing his or her 
ability to perform under the contract. 
46 Thomas, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 178, 422 N.E.2d at 478. 
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